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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Will of the People1 is surely a magnificent accomplishment.  Barry 
Friedman has written a grand history of the relationships between popular 
opinion, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, telling the story from the 
conception and birth of the United States Constitution through the early 
days of the Roberts Court.  In this essay, I will be interrogating the thesis of 
The Will of the People; that thesis is announced in the subtitle, How Public 
Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the 
Constitution.  I am not a historian; my bailiwick is legal theory.  So I will be 
asking questions about the theoretical foundations and conceptual nature of 
Friedman’s claims.  Questions like: “What are the theoretical assumptions 
of Friedman’s claim that public opinion influences the Supreme Court?” 
Friedman’s method is narrative.  He has a story to tell.  There are sto-
ries, and then there are stories.  Friedman might have approached the rela-
tionship between public opinion and the Supreme Court’s opinions with 
theoretical modesty: “Just the historical facts, ma’am.”  One of the great 
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 1. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2009). 
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strengths of The Will of the People is that much of what it does is just that—
a detailed retelling of the story of American constitutional law accompanied 
by a detailed narrative that recounts the state of public opinion before, dur-
ing, and after the legal events.  Much of Friedman’s book consists of what 
appears to be straight narrative or descriptive history. 
But The Will of the People is not a theoretically modest book.  It 
makes important theoretical claims of two kinds.  First and foremost, The 
Will of the People is an exercise in mostly implicit (but frequently explicit) 
positive legal theory: it makes sweeping claims about the causal mecha-
nisms that determine the content of constitutional law.  The Will of the Peo-
ple claims that “popular opinion has influenced the Supreme Court and 
shaped the meaning of the Constitution,” and it seems fair to recharacterize 
Friedman’s claim as a bit stronger than that.  A slightly longer and less ele-
gant subtitle might have been: “How Popular Opinion Controls the Supreme 
Court and Determines the Content of Constitutional Law.” 
The Will of the People makes another sort of claim—albeit less 
overtly.  Friedman’s book displays a normative vision of constitutional 
practice.  Some historians eschew “the lessons of history,” but not Fried-
man.  The Will of the People applauds a progressive version of popular con-
stitutionalism and displays open hostility to the normative constitutional 
theories that emphasize the rule of law and the binding force of the constitu-
tional text.  Another version of the subtitle might have read: “Why Popular 
Opinion Should Influence the Supreme Court and Ought to Determine the 
Meaning of the Constitution.” 
The Will of the People makes both positive and normative claims, and 
these claims depend on theoretical assumptions.  In these remarks, my aim 
is to tease out these assumptions and question their validity. 
II. POSITIVE LEGAL THEORY AND THE CAUSAL INFLUENCE OF 
POPULAR OPINION 
The interrogation of The Will of the People can begin with a prelimi-
nary investigation into the nature of the claims that it makes.  We can begin 
by investigating the general structure of Friedman’s argument, which pro-
ceeds from narrative to causation. 
A.  Narratives and Causation 
Positive legal theory takes as its subject matter questions about the 
causal forces that determine legal content.  In the context of constitutional 
law, such questions include the following: 
• “What causal forces determine the outcomes of Supreme Court 
opinions in constitutional cases?”   
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• “What role does political ideology play in determining the selec-
tion of Supreme Court justices?”   
• “Do the views of individual justices about interpretive method-
ology have a causal influence on their votes in individual 
cases?”   
And these questions (about causal forces and mechanisms) lead to other 
questions about methodology:  
• “Does rational choice theory provide the best explanatory 
framework for studying judicial behavior?”   
• “Can historical narratives generate causal explanations?”   
• “Must causal theories of judicial behavior specify the mecha-
nisms (or “microfoundations”) by which causal forces work?”   
The two different kinds of questions point to two different types of 
positive legal theory:  (1) theories that provide causal explanations for par-
ticular legal events or general event types (causal theories), and (2) theories 
that describe and assess the methods for the production of causal explana-
tions (methodological theories). 
The Will of the People contains both implicit and explicit causal theo-
ries, but it has very little to say about methodology.  This is not surprising.  
The Will of the People presents itself as a narrative—as a story about the 
interactions between popular opinion and constitutional law.  One can tell 
stories without making causal claims:  let us call such stories causally ag-
nostic.  A causally agnostic story simply relates the flow of events—first A, 
then B, then C, then D, and so forth. 
But very few stories are causally agnostic all the way down.  Even a 
story that is causally agnostic on its surface can be read as making (implicit 
but deep) causal claims.  Even a simple event, such as brushing one’s teeth, 
involves a vast number of component events, each of which can be de-
scribed in multitudinous ways.  The movement of an arm can be described 
in the language of physics, kinesiology, or chemistry, but most narrative 
descriptions of actions like brushing one’s teeth assume an intentionalist 
causal framework: “John reached for the brush and lifted it to his mouth, 
then methodically worked the bristles up and down.”  This narrative de-
scription implicitly provides a causal theory: John’s intentional actions 
caused the movement of the brush.  And the brushing narrative also relies 
implicitly on a methodological theory; intentional explanations of human 
behavior that rely on the concepts of folk psychology are sound.2 
  
 2. On folk psychology and its relationship to narrative, see DANIEL D. HUTTO, 
FOLK PSYCHOLOGICAL NARRATIVES: THE SOCIOCULTURAL BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING 
REASONS (Cambridge (MA: MIT Press, 2008). Cf. MATTHEW RATCLIFFE. RETHINKING 
COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY: A CRITIQUE OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, THEORY OF MIND AND 
SIMULATION (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2007) (discussing philosophical debates 
about folk psychology). 
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The implications of this point about narrative and causal claims are 
profound.  Many stories that seem, on their surface, to be causally agnostic 
are, in fact, implicitly making assertions about causation.  Let us call a nar-
rative that commits (implicitly or explicitly) to causal claims, causally-
committed.  I said “many stories” but the use of the word “many” is mis-
leading.  For something to count as a recognizable narrative, it must do 
more than string together a series of events in chronological order.  Narra-
tives make sense because they identify causally salient actions and events.  
This point should be qualified; not every event or action in a story is caus-
ally salient, and there may be some stories that emphasize events that are 
causally irrelevant.  And we might even be able to imagine something we 
could call a “story” that consisted entirely of a random sequence of causally 
unrelated events.  But that would be a special and derivative use of the word 
“story.”  Historical narratives are always—or almost always—committed to 
explicit and implicit causal claims.  The Will of the People is a causally 
committed historical narrative. 
There is another deeply important point about the relationship between 
narrative and causation: causally committed narratives implicitly or explic-
itly make claims about counterfactuals.3  A definition first:  the term “coun-
terfactual” refers to an event or state that is contrary to fact.  Causally 
committed narratives have counterfactual implications.  If public opinion 
caused the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,4 then it follows that 
had public opinion been relevantly different, Brown would have been de-
cided differently. 
This point about Brown (and causation generally) needs to be quali-
fied; if an event is overdetermined,5 then it was the product of more than 
one sufficient cause.  Suppose that the decision in Brown were caused by 
both public opinion and the belief on the part of the justices of the Supreme 
Court that national security required an end to segregation (because segre-
gation sustained devastatingly effective Soviet propaganda). If public opin-
ion alone had been different, the outcome would have been the same, but if 
neither public opinion nor the national security beliefs of the justices had 
been present, then Brown would have been decided differently.  For the 
sake of simplicity, let us put overdetermination to the side for the remainder 
of this discussion. 
  
 3. For discussion of counterfactuals and causation, see DAVID LEWIS, 
COUNTERFACTUALS (Oxford: Blackwell 1973) (discussing counterfacutals); CAUSATION AND 
COUNTERFACTUALS (John Collins, Ned Hall & L.A. Paul eds. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 
(2004) (collection of essays on the relationship between counterfactuals and causation). 
 4. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 5. For discussion of overdetermination, see MICHAEL MOORE, CAUSATION AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 86-88, 114-15 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009) (discussing overdetermination in the context of criminal 
responsibility). 
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Because historical narratives are causally committed, they make coun-
terfactual claims.  Sometimes these claims are explicit.  The narrative in-
cludes sentences that begin “it could have gone otherwise” or “absent this 
event” and then proceed to describe a possible world6 in which the causally 
salient action or event had not occurred.  But it is frequently the case that 
the counterfactual claims made by historical narratives are implicit rather 
than explicit.  The narrative tells the story as it actually happened, implying 
both causal commitment and counterfactual claims.  Because The Will of the 
People is a causally committed historical narrative, it is no surprise that 
most of the counterfactual claims that it makes are implicit. 
One more point about causation and narrative: causation requires 
mechanism.7  The core of this point is so familiar that it hardly needs expli-
cation.  “Post hoc ergo propter hoc” (after this, therefore because of this) is 
an informal fallacy.  “Correlation does not equal causation” is familiar to 
most undergraduates.  There are circumstances where very strong correla-
tions lead us to believe that causation must be present:  for example, social 
scientists use elaborate statistical techniques (e.g., multiple regression 
analysis) that enable them to identify correlations that are strong evidence of 
causation.  But true causation requires that a mechanism be present—even if 
we do not know what the mechanism is.  Narratives emphasize temporal 
sequence (A then B then C), but temporal proximity is not sufficient to es-
tablish causation. 
This brings us to the sixty-four thousand dollar question:  can histori-
cal narratives provide good and sufficient reasons for the acceptance of 
causal claims?  The narrative tells us how the story went, but not how it 
would have gone.  There are a variety of possible answers to the sixty-four 
thousand dollar question.  For example, narratives may identify sequences 
of events in which the causal forces are obvious (part of the background 
knowledge of the author and reader of the narrative).  The well-established 
laws of natural science provide the causal glue in many narratives, and such 
laws provide causal connections between bullets and injuries, plagues and 
illnesses, earthquakes and tsunamis.  But when narratives seek to explain 
human behavior, the background causal theory is usually based on folk psy-
chology or rational choice theory:8 the narratives assume that human behav-
  
 6. The philosophical idea of a “possible world” is similar to the notion of a state of 
affairs.  For a comprehensive introduction, see JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (London: 
Routledge, 2002) (discussing the notion of a possible world in contemporary philosophy). 
 7. JON ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX 5-8 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985) (discussing role of mechanisms in causal theories); JON ELSTER, NUTS AND 
BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 3-10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) (dis-
cussing mechanisms in the context of the social sciences). 
 8. For an introduction to rational choice theory, see ITZHAK GILBOA, RATIONAL 
CHOICE (Cambridge: MIT Press 2010) (discussing rational choice theory).  For folk psychol-
ogy, see Hutton, supra note 2; Ratcliffe, supra note 2 (discussing folk psychology). 
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ior is caused by the beliefs and desires of individuals.  The Will of the Peo-
ple makes assumptions of precisely this sort, explaining the behavior of the 
Supreme Court on the basis of the beliefs and desires of the individual jus-
tices. 
Narratives can provide important and illuminating input for the devel-
opment of causal theories, but they can also be misleading.  The construc-
tion of a narrative requires the identification of salient actions and events.  
Narratives tell a story, but they cannot tell the whole story.  This means that 
the construction of narratives faces a problem of selection bias.  If the narra-
tor has prior beliefs (which need not be conscious or explicit) about causa-
tion, those prior beliefs may determine which actions and events are in-
cluded in the narrative and which are excluded.  The resulting narrative then 
seems to establish a pattern of causation.  For example, the narrative might 
suggest the following pattern of behavior by the Supreme Court:  popular 
opinion favors X, then the Supreme Court decides to allow or require X.  
The repetition of that pattern can leads authors and readers to make implicit 
counterfactual assumptions:  if popular opinion had not favored X, then the 
Supreme Court would not have decided to allow or require X.  And these 
implicit counterfactual assumptions then validate explicit or implicit causal 
claims:  public opinion causally determines the outcome of Supreme Court 
opinions.  And these causal claims may be true!  But the narrative may not 
have established the truth of the causal claims.  Because selection bias can 
produce the appearance of causation even when true causation is not pre-
sent, even a compelling story may not provide a good and sufficient reason 
to believe the storyteller’s causal claims are true. 
The validation of causal claims always requires more than narrative.  
Sometimes the “something more” is obvious and uncontroversial—such as 
the laws of physics or cases in which folk psychology approximates the 
truth.  But when we are trying to give causal explanations for complex so-
cial phenomenon—the behavior of the Supreme Court in particular or 
American constitutional practice is general—it is quite likely that the 
“something more” will be neither obvious nor uncontroversial.  The constel-
lation of actions and events that influence the Supreme Court and shape the 
meaning of the Constitution is likely to be complex, involving interaction 
between a multitude of individual actors that produce unintended conse-
quences. 
And this brings us back to The Will of the People and its claim that 
popular opinion has influence the Supreme Court and shaped the meaning 
of the Constitution?  Has Friedman given us good and sufficient reasons to 
accept these claims?  We can begin with the first claim about the influence 
of popular opinion on the Supreme Court. 
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B.  Has Popular Opinion “Influenced the Supreme Court” and “Shaped the 
Meaning of the Constitution”? 
The core of The Will of the People is a narrative that relates public 
opinion to judicial behavior.  Friedman’s narrative is remarkable for both its 
erudition and scope.  No single volume could possibly canvass the state of 
public opinion, before, during, and after the decision of every constitutional 
opinion by the Supreme Court.  But Friedman has provided a narrative that 
encompasses both the familiar and the obscure, at exactly the right level of 
detail. 
But does this narrative establish Friedman’s causal claims?  The an-
swer to this question cannot be found in the narrative itself.  Friedman’s 
story about the Supreme Court is not the only story that could be told.  We 
can easily imagine alternative narratives that would provide plausible stories 
about the causal antecedents for decisions of the Supreme Court.  Call one 
such story the law story: this story would trace important decisions of the 
Supreme Court to legal antecedents, including, for example, the text of the 
Constitution, prior decisions of the Court itself, background principles 
found in the common-law decisions of American and English courts, and so 
forth.  The law story is at least as rich and textured as the story that Fried-
man told.  And the law story has been told many times, exhaustively in 
some of the volumes in the Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of 
the United States.9 
Or consider another story, which we can call the elites story.  The 
elites story would situate the decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to 
the interests and values of elite groups.  Public opinion might figure in this 
story, but it would be primarily a dependent variable (something that was 
subject to manipulation by economic and political elites).  This story would 
focus on instances in which the actions of the Court served elite interests or 
reflected elite values, in spite of popular sentiment to the contrary.  Lucas 
A. Powe, Jr. tells a version of the elites story in his book, The Supreme 
Court and the American Elite, 1789-2008.10 
Selective narrative cannot, by itself, establish the causal claims that 
Friedman makes in The Will of the People.  Such causal claims can only be 
established by combining narrative with two additional elements:  (1) theo-
ries of causal mechanism, and (2) rigorous empirical confirmation.  Fried-
  
 9. See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1971); William M. Wiecek, 12 THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 10. Lucas A. Powe Jr., The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789-2008 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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man has something to say about the first element (causal mechanisms) and 
remarkable little to say about the second (empirical confirmation).  Fried-
man does have some general and suggestive remarks about the relationship 
between his narrative and the social scientific approach to the relationship 
between popular opinion and judicial behavior: 
[W]hat we ought to be asking, is how much capacity the justices have to act inde-
pendently of the public’s views, how likely they are to do so, and in what situa-
tions.  Is the Court even capable of standing up for constitutional rights when they 
are jeopardized by the majority? . . . [W]hat determines how far the Court can 
move away from the public before it is snapped back into line?11 
Friedman then asserts that the social science answering these ques-
tions is “remarkably impoverished.”12  He writes: 
The failure to devote adequate attention to these important questions traces back to 
a long-standing disagreement between political scientists over whether law or poli-
tics motivates the Supreme Court’s decisions, one dating back to the aftermath of 
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan.  In recent years, fortunately, scholars in both law 
and politics have begun to move past this silliness.  Plainly what the justices do is 
law, and it does not detract from this point to acknowledge that they have a certain 
amount of discretion, even a large amount of it.  But politics plainly influences the 
Court as well, in numerous ways ranging from the appointments process to respon-
siveness to public sentiments.  Recent scholarship endeavors to say something tan-
gible about the Supreme Court’s responsiveness to (and independence from) popu-
lar politics, about what decides cases, and how all this works.13 
The final sentence of this passage is followed by a footnote that cites some 
recent literature on the relationship between public opinion.14 
What does that literature have to say about causal mechanisms and 
empirical confirmation?  Consider one of the articles that Friedman cites, 
William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan’s The Supreme Court as a Coun-
termajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme 
Court Decisions.15  Mishler and Sheehan describe two mechanisms by 
which public opinion can affect the behavior of the Supreme Court:  one 
that operates via the judicial selection process and another that operates 
through political adjustment by the Justices themselves.  What are these 
mechanisms?  And what does Friedman have to say about them? 
The first mechanism relies on the ability of the dominant political coa-
lition to appoint justices to the Supreme Court.  Thus, public opinion deter-
mines the ideological orientation of the President and the Senate; this leads 
  
 11. The Will of the People, p 373. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 582 n. 49. 
 15. William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a counterma-
joritarian institution? The impact of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions, 87 
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 90 (1993). 
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to the appointment of justices who reflect public opinion.  This first mecha-
nism is famously described in the work of Robert Dahl16 and Richard Fun-
ston17 and is sometimes called the Dahl-Funston hypothesis.18 Friedman 
seems to reject the explanatory power of the Dahl-Funston hypothesis. He 
writes: 
Undoubtedly, the fact that Presidents select Supreme Court justices and the Senate 
confirms them plays some role in ensuring that the Court heeds the cry of public 
opinion.  But it probably does not explain nearly as much as one would think.  
Contrary to folk wisdom Presidents can usually get the sort of justice they want: 
however they are rarely driven to appoint justices who capture the mainstream of 
popular thought.  Only recently have Presidents become so single-mindedly fo-
cused on the ideology of their appointees, and in doing so they often have proven 
beholden to the extremists in their own party.19 
This passage is remarkable for combining bold and controversial em-
pirical claims with almost nothing in the way of evidence or explanation.  
An adequate assessment of Friedman’s claims in this paragraph could easily 
require an entire article, but a few comments can illustrate some of the diffi-
culties.  Assume that Presidents want the Court to align with their own po-
litical ideology.  If Presidents had a unilateral power of appointment, they 
would select Justices whose ideology is identical to their own.  But Presi-
dents do not have a unilateral power of appointment; the Senate must ap-
prove Supreme Court Justices by a majority vote.  If we assume that Sena-
tors also want Justices whose ideology aligns with their own, they will vote 
against nominees who move the ideological balance of the Court away from 
their own ideological orientation.  And this picture is complicated by the 
fact that the filibuster permits forty-one members of the Senate to block a 
judicial nomination.  Presidents who want their nominees confirmed must 
consider whether their nominee will receive fifty-one votes on the floor and 
whether the nomination will trigger a filibuster requiring a sixty-vote su-
permajority to move to a vote on the merits.  It is difficult to see how this 
process could possibly result in presidential nomination of candidates who 
would please “extremists in [the President’s] own party.”20  And even if a 
President wanted to nominate an ideological extremist, it is difficult to 
imagine how such a candidate could be confirmed—so long as Senators 
care about the ideological makeup of the Court. 
What should we expect from the institutional structure of the nomina-
tion and confirmation process?  The answer to this question will depend on 
  
 16. Robert Dahl, Decisionmaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a Na-
tional Policymaker, 6 Journal of Public Law 279 (1957). 
 17. Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 795 (1975). 
 18. Id. at 88-89. 
 19. The Will of the People, p. 374 (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. 
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both the ideological makeup of the Senate, the ideological preferences of 
the President, and the ideological balance on the current Supreme Court.  
For example, if the median Justice on the Supreme Court (“median” on the 
basis of political ideology) is very conservative and the President and sixty 
Senators are very liberal, we could expect that the President will nominate 
and the Senate will confirm a liberal nominee.  But suppose that the median 
Justice is conservative, the President is very liberal, but the median Senator 
(again “median” on the basis of political ideology) is a political moderate.  
The median Senator may be unwilling to confirm a very liberal nominee.  If 
the President knows that this is the case, the President may select the most 
liberal nominee the median Senator would be willing to confirm.  When that 
nominee was in fact confirmed, it might appear that the President had been 
able to “get the sort of justice” that the President wanted, but this appear-
ance could be deceiving—because the President might have picked some-
one else had the composition of the Senate been different. 
Given the strategic interactions produced by the institutional frame-
work for judicial selection, what affect will public opinion have?  Again, 
this question is complex and an adequate answer would require a mono-
graph (or a series of monographs).  Much might depend on the role that 
votes on judicial nominations by Senators have on their chances for reelec-
tion.  If we assume that Senators attempt to vote in ways that are acceptable 
to the median voter in their state (again “median” on the basis of political 
ideology), then the confirmability of judicial nominees will depend on the 
ideological makeup of the electorate.  Given the structure of the Senate (two 
Senators per state), the ideology of the median Senator might vary signifi-
cantly from the ideology of the median voter in the Unites States as a whole. 
These observations about Friedman’s brief comments with respect to 
the relationship between public opinion and the nomination and confirma-
tion of Supreme Court Justices have a very limited purpose.  My point is 
simply that Friedman’s bold claims are not well supported, either by a the-
ory of the judicial selection process or by empirical evidence. 
So much for the first mechanism by which public opinion could influ-
ence the Supreme Court.  What about the second? Mishler and Sheehan call 
the second mechanism “the political adjustment hypothesis.”  Here is their 
description: 
[A]nother perspective holds that the Court can and does respond to public opinion 
even in the absence of membership change. The argument usually advanced is that 
Supreme Court justices are acutely aware of the limitations of the Court’s power 
and its dependence on voluntary acquiescence to its decisions . . . . 
According to this argument, the Court’s concern for its authority makes it reluctant 
to depart too far or too long in its decisions from prevailing public sentiment. . . . 
[M]embers of the Court are political creatures, who are broadly aware of funda-
mental trends in ideological tenor of public opinion, and that at least some justices, 
consciously or not, may adjust their decisions at the margins to accommodate such 
fundamental trends. 
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Even in the absence of concerns about the legitimacy of the Court’s decisions, 
there are good reasons to believe that Supreme Court justices may be influenced by 
long-term changes in the climate of public opinion. Justices are no less susceptible 
than other individuals in society to influence by evolving societal norms and val-
ues. . . . 
The likelihood, of course, is that under either of these variants of what we shall call 
the political adjustment hypothesis, the resulting changes in the decisions of indi-
vidual justices will occur gradually over time and be almost imperceptible at the 
moment. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect the results of a specific public opinion poll 
to be linked to specific decisions either of an individual justice or of the Court as a 
whole. The expectation, rather, is that the overall pattern of justices’ decisions--and 
thus the ideological center of gravity of the Court--should respond gradually, and 
at a considerable lag, to broad trends in the ideology of the public.21 
And what is the state of the evidence for the political adjustment hy-
pothesis?  Mishler and Sheehan found strong evidence that decisions of the 
Supreme Court responded to public opinion with a five-year lag between 
1951 and 1981, when Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency.22  They find 
that much of this influence was attributable to the ideological make up of 
Congress and the President, but: 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that public opinion exercises important influ-
ence on the decisions of the Supreme Court even in the absence of changes in the 
composition of the Court or in the partisan and ideological makeup of Congress 
and the presidency.23 
But after 1981 the evidence pointed in another direction: 
[O]ur analyses indicate that the relationship of the Court to public opinion has been 
very different in the years since 1981. The decisions of the Court during the 
Reagan years were significantly countermajoritarian in direction and appear to 
have been driven almost entirely by the changing ideological orientation of the 
Court. The Court grew increasingly conservative across this period despite a liberal 
resurgence in the public mood. Although the conservative appointments of Presi-
dents Nixon and Ford probably reflected the prevailing public sentiment at the 
time, the appointments of President Reagan increasingly did not. Moreover, it is 
highly likely that the conservative ideology of the Court and its decisions have ei-
ther remained unchanged or grown increasingly conservative during the Bush ad-
ministration, given the appointments of Justices Souter and Thomas. Thus, there is 
every reason to believe that the gap between public opinion and the decisions of 
the Court has continued to widen.24 
And what does Friedman have to say about the political adjustment 
hypothesis?  He suggests that the justices may immediately respond to pub-
lic opinion, because “it is human nature to be liked or even applauded and 
admired,” but “[t]he most telling reason why the justice might care about 
  
 21. Id. 
 22. Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 15, at 96. 
 23. Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 15, at 96. 
 24. Id. at 97. 
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public opinion . . . is simply that they do not have much of a choice. . . . If 
preceding history shows anything it is that when judicial decisions wander 
far from what the public will tolerate, bad things happen to the Court and 
the justices.”25 
Friedman formulates this claim so that it is almost tautological.  The 
key phrase is “what the public will tolerate.”26  Of course, when the Court 
acts in ways that the public does not tolerate, by definition, the public re-
acts.  But this formulation is not helpful if our aim is to determine the causal 
mechanisms by which public opinion influences the Supreme Court.  As-
sessment of those mechanisms requires a theory as to what deviations be-
tween Supreme Court behavior and public opinion “the public will toler-
ate.”27  And the theory must account for the ability of the Court to take pub-
lic tolerance into account.  If public intolerance is an occasional and unpre-
dictable phenomenon, then it is difficult to see how it could be the case that 
their voting behavior could be influenced by it. 
There is another difficulty with Friedman’s hypothesis about judicial 
anticipation of public intolerance.  Friedman observes “that it has been a 
long time since the justices were disciplined in any significant way.”28  Not-
ing that the last threat of court packing was fended off in 1937 and that the 
last serious attempt at jurisdiction stripping failed in 1957, Friedman asserts 
that it “seems paradoxical . . . that in recent years, as these weapons to con-
trol the justices look to have been ruled off the table or lost their force, the 
Court has come most directly into line with public opinion.”29  He then 
writes: 
The explanation for this paradox is that it has take the Court and public some time 
to learn how their relationship might work; now that it is understood, violent up-
heaval is no longer necessary.30 
This is itself an empirical hypothesis, but Friedman offers almost no 
evidence for these sweeping claims.  Is it in fact that case that Supreme 
Court Justices have been ignorant of the possibility that their decisions 
would provoke political backlash until recently?  This is an assertion about 
the knowledge of particular individuals; redeeming the claim requires more 
than a showing that the Court has provoked political retaliation. 
But suppose that Friedman were right about this claim.  The implica-
tion would be that the primary mechanism by which public opinion does 
influence the behavior of the Court has not been in operation until recent 
years.  But the argument of The Will of the People seems to be to the con-
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trary.  Friedman’s book seems to tell a story of substantial public influence 
over the whole history of the Court—that story is not limited to instances in 
which the Court was actually disciplined by court packing, jurisdiction 
stripping, or impeachment. 
There is yet another problem with Friedman’s “learning curve” hy-
pothesis.  It is not clear that it would be confirmed by rigorous empirical 
work.  Indeed, Mishler and Sheehan, in the very article cited by Friedman, 
reached exactly the opposite conclusion in the passage quoted above: “The 
decisions of the Court during the Reagan years were significantly counter-
majoritarian in direction and appear to have been driven almost entirely by 
the changing ideological orientation of the Court.”31 
The Will of the People tells a plausible story about the relationship be-
tween public opinion and the decisions of the Supreme Court.  Does Fried-
man’s narrative establish his central thesis—that public opinion has influ-
enced the Supreme Court?  Has he shown that “the Supreme Court exercises 
the power it has precisely because that is the will of the people”?32  Does his 
story make “the case that when judges rely on the Constitution to invalidate 
the actions of the other branches of government, they are enforcing the will 
of the American people”?33  Surely, Friedman’s narrative is suggestive—it 
provides a series of anecdotes and incidents that are consistent with his 
causal claims.  But Friedman’s narrative falls short of providing good and 
sufficient evidence for our acceptance of his broad causal claims, because it 
lacks a rigorous account of causal mechanisms and empirical confirmation 
of their operation. 
III. NORMATIVE LEGAL THEORY: POPULAR OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 
The primary thrust of The Will of the People is positive, but it is clear 
that Friedman’s narrative is also deeply normative.  What are the normative 
assumptions of Friedman’s story about the relationship between popular 
opinion and the Constitution? 
A.  Narrative and Normativity 
Just as the relationship of narrative history to causation is an uneasy 
one, so too is the connection between narrative and normativity.  Some nar-
rative histories enthusiastically embrace normativity: Howard Zinn’s A 
People’s History of the United States is a clear case of narrative with ex-
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plicit normative commitments.34  But the normative claims of narratives are 
frequently implicit, and they rarely come in the form of fully developed 
normative arguments.  The deep normative assumptions of narrative fre-
quently come to the surface in the form of value-laden descriptions.  Ac-
tions are explained by motives that are characterized as selfish or altruistic.  
Events are characterized as disasters or triumphs.  At one level, the norma-
tivity of narrative is inescapable.  The stories that interest humans are “mo-
rality plays,” with heroes and villains, happy endings and tragic finales, 
poetic justice and cruel twists of fate.  No one should expect narrators to 
engage in “normative abstinence.”  But some narrative histories are more 
explicit in their normative ambitions than others; let us call narratives that 
explicitly draw lessons from history “normatively charged.” 
The Will of the People is a normatively-charged narrative; it is explicit 
about its normative ambitions and implications.  The final chapter is titled, 
“Conclusion:  What History Teaches,” and the lessons of history are offered 
as guidance for the future.  Friedman’s normative vision is tangibly present 
on almost every page of The Will of the People, but at the same time it is 
elusive.  Friedman’s evaluations are clear, but the normative commitments 
that motivate them are all but invisible. 
The Will of the People concludes with these remarks: 
[I]t is wrong to claim, as many have, that the judges have stolen the Constitution 
from us.  Judicial review is our invention; we created it and have chosen to retain 
it.  Judicial review has served as a means of forcing us to think about, and interpret, 
our Constitution ourselves.  In the final analysis, when it comes to the Constitution, 
we are the highest court in the land.35 
Stirring words, but what exactly do they mean?  Clearly, they repre-
sent Friedman’s rejection of an argument against judicial review based on 
the premise that the Supreme Court’s power to invalidate the acts of elected 
officials is antidemocratic.  If we know anything about Barry Friedman, we 
know that he does not accept the “countermajoritarian difficulty.” 
Friedman’s refutation of the countermajoritarian difficulty is “on 
stage.”  But what are the normative commitments that are “behind the 
scenes”—implicitly animating the lessons of history that Friedman draws 
from his narrative?  The remainder of this Part will explore two implicit 
normative claims in The Will of the People.  The first relates to the concept 
of democratic legitimacy: Friedman’s narrative rests on implicit claims 
about the nature of a democratic people and the capacity of democratic will 
formation to confer legitimacy on constitutional practice.  The second im-
plicit normative claim relates to normative constitutional theory, and in par-
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ticular, to Friedman’s normative assessment of originalism and its rival, 
living constitutionalism. 
B.  Democratic Legitimacy and “The Will of the People” 
The normative commitments of The Will of the People are deeply 
connected with notions of popular sovereignty and democratic legitimacy.  
Friedman’s narrative is built on a vocabulary that emphasizes the word 
“people”36 and related terms and phrases (e.g., “the will of the people,”37 
“public opinion,”38 “the American People,”39 “government by the people,”40 
“majority rule,”41 “the people alone,”42 “the will of the majority,”43 and “ma-
jority will.”44  But what do these phrases mean?  Why are they normatively 
significant? 
Friedman’s narrative is both normatively charged and grand in scope; 
it deals with most of the important events of American political history and 
it makes implicit normative claims about their democratic legitimacy.  As a 
consequence, The Will of the People inevitably implicates all of the grand 
questions of political theory.  But because Friedman’s book is structured as 
a narrative, the precise nature of its normative claims is obscure. 
The normative obscurity that characterizes The Will of the People is 
particularly acute when it comes to questions of democratic theory.  What 
form of “democracy” grounds Friedman’s normative claims?  How is this 
form of democracy justified?  Friedman might adopt what we might call an 
“avoidance strategy” with respect to these questions.  He might argue, for 
example, that the normative elements in The Will of the People are based on 
very “thin” assumptions or that his normative conclusions will hold for any 
plausible version of democratic theory.  For example, he might claim that 
his normatively charged narrative is consistent with either of the two (cur-
rent and important) versions of democratic theory.  We can call the first 
version “egalitarian democracy”45 (democratic institution are justified by 
concern for the equality of citizens) and second version “deliberative de-
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mocracy”46 (democracy legitimates through reasons that emerge from dis-
cursive practices). 
Were Friedman to explicitly pursue the avoidance strategy, it seems 
likely that he would immediately encounter a number of obstacles.  In par-
ticular, Friedman will run into what is sometimes called “the problem of 
democratic citizenship.”47  Given the division of labor it is simply impossi-
ble for most citizens to participate in a meaningful way in democratic poli-
tics.  When it comes to monitoring the Supreme Court this problem is par-
ticularly acute, since acquisition of the legal knowledge necessary for com-
prehension of most constitutional issues is particularly costly.  On the famil-
iar Downsian model, it would simply be irrational for most citizens to incur 
these costs.48 
Are Friedman’s implicit normative claims consistent with both egali-
tarian and deliberative conceptions of democracy?  It is difficult to see how 
he could make out the case that they are.  If our conception of democracy is 
egalitarian, the problem of democratic citizenship in the constitutional con-
text is particularly acute: it seems utterly implausible to believe that the 
processes Friedman describes as popular checks on the Court operate in an 
egalitarian fashion.  No plausible case could be made that any of the par-
ticular examples of popular influence on the Court that Friedman recounts 
involved equal participation and influence—I cannot even imagine how that 
story might go in the case of Roosevelt’s confrontation with the Court.   
And if Friedman’s conception of democracy is deliberative, then the diffi-
culties loom even larger.  Because of the complexity of constitutional issues 
and the mediation of popular opinion through the steering mechanisms of 
partisan politics that operates through the institutional structures (political 
parties, Congress, and so forth), it would be extraordinarily difficult for 
Friedman to demonstrate that the demanding standards of deliberative de-
mocracy have ever been satisfied—much less that their satisfaction is char-
acteristic of popular influence on the Court. 
But the fact that Friedman cannot successfully execute the avoidance 
strategy does not imply that he has not responded to the problem of democ-
ratic citizenship.  Perhaps Friedman’s narrative rests on an implicit concep-
tion of democracy that avoids the problems that arise for egalitarian and 
deliberative democracy.  The alternative to avoidance strategy is for Fried-
man to offer a particular democratic theory, which must include (1) an ac-
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count of the justification for democracy, (2) an account of the conditions 
that must be satisfied for social arrangements to count as sufficiently de-
mocratic, and (3) an account of the scope and limits of the legitimacy that 
this kind of democracy confers on political decisions. 
Even if Friedman were to articulate and defend a particular democratic 
theory, it is far from clear that any such theory could redeem some of the 
extravagant claims that are made in The Will of the People.  Friedman 
makes claims about “the will of the people”.  In particular he claims that 
“[j]udicial review is our invention” and it “forc[es] us to think about, and 
interpret, our Constitution ourselves” and hence “we are the highest court in 
the land.”49  These claims commit Friedman to wildly implausible views 
about group agency and intentional group action. 
Friedman seems to be assuming that there is an entity meaningfully 
identified as “the American people” that can have a “will” and engage in 
actions like the invention of judicial review, constitutional interpretation, 
and serving as a court.  Of course, it is possible that Friedman said these 
things but did not really mean them.  It might be the case that “the will of 
the people” is merely a metaphor.  It could be that judicial review is not 
actually the invention of the American people at all.  Friedman might in-
stead mean something like: “Judicial review arose from the unintended con-
sequences of many actions over a long period of time.  Some of those ac-
tions were by actions by ordinary American citizens.”  But if that is what 
Friedman meant, he has chosen a form of expression that is misleading at 
best and deceptive at worst. 
Assuming that Friedman means what he says and that he is committed 
to the idea that the American people have exercised group agency, then we 
can ask whether his claims are plausible.  Let us begin that inquiry with two 
assumptions.  First, we can assume “methodological individualism:”50 the 
basic premise, familiar from the social sciences, that the actions of groups 
must ultimately be explained in terms of the actions of individuals.  Second, 
we can assume that group action is possible.  That is, we can assume that 
there are circumstances in which two or more persons can act in a coordi-
nated fashion so that their coordinated activity can be attributed to each 
individual and the group.  These two premises lead to a corollary:  conse-
quences produced by the unintended consequences of uncoordinated actions 
by individuals are not meaningfully characterized as “group action.” 
Given these assumptions, is it plausible to characterize the responsive-
ness of the Supreme Court to public opinion in the vocabulary of group 
agency?  It is hard to see how Friedman could make the case that a group 
agent (the American People) engaged in group action (invented judicial 
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review).  Groups as large as “the American people” cannot directly engage 
in coordinated action.  This fact is not inconsistent with the notion that insti-
tutions that bear a relationship to the American people exist and act, but 
institutional action (action by particular courts or legislative bodies) is not 
the same thing as action by the American people. 
These remarks merely pose a problem for Friedman.  I have not shown 
that Friedman could not offer a theory of group agency that would redeem 
his bold claims.  Perhaps Friedman can produce a theory of group agency 
that will redeem his claims.  My modest point is that The Will of the People 
uses the language of group agency in ways that seem implausible. 
C.  Original Public Meaning versus Living Popular Constitutionalism 
The Will of the People is most explicitly normative in its concluding 
remarks about the lessons of history, but Friedman’s narrative is norma-
tively charged throughout, although the strength of the charge varies from 
passage to passage and chapter to chapter.  The normative charge is near its 
peak in Chapter 9, entitled “Interpretation,” where Friedman discusses 
originalism and living constitutionalism.51 
Consider, for example, Friedman’s discussion of the development of 
originalist theory.  He wrote: 
Although conservative thinkers in and outside the Department of Justice obviously 
did not conjure up the idea of originalism out of thin air, the brand of originalism 
they promoted plainly was a doctrine of their own creation.  For much of American 
history, courts had looked to both the Constitution’s text and framing era assump-
tions.  Still it was just one of many interpretive strategies they used, including also 
stare decisis and the idea of the evolutionary Constitution.52 
The footnote to this passage includes only a single citation, to Philip Bob-
bitt’s monograph, Constitutional Fate,53 which famously argues that consti-
tutional practice includes six modalities of argument: structural, textual, 
ethical, prudential, historical, and doctrinal.54 
Was “originalism” a doctrine of Reagan-era conservative thinker’s 
own creation?  Friedman is likely to have been aware that Paul Brest coined 
the term “originalism” prior to the Reagan presidency.55  Here is how Brest 
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defined “originalism”:  “By ‘originalism’ I mean the familiar approach to 
constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the 
Constitution or the intentions of its adopters.”56 
Unlike Brest, who believed that originalism was a familiar approach, 
Friedman seems to assert that “originalism” was a creation of Reagan-era 
conservatives.  That assertion makes a claim of historical fact, but this por-
tion of Friedman’s narrative is normatively charged.  Friedman’s narrative 
implies that conservative lawyers and theoreticians created originalism for 
political reasons, while claiming that their new method had a long historical 
pedigree.  In other words, the narrative aims to show that originalism is 
normatively unattractive because those who “created” originalism were 
politically motivated and intellectually dishonest. 
This same pattern appears in another passage of Friedman’s norma-
tively charged narrative: 
There is no small tension between the claim that originalism had a long history and 
the gushing excitement Federalist Society leaders expressed about their “refine-
ment” of the doctrine: long-established and well-accepted methods of interpreting 
the Constitution do not need to be hashed out in skull sessions.57 
The source cited for direct support is the Report to the Attorney Gen-
eral, Original Meaning Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook, prepared by the Of-
fice of Legal Policy.  The clarifying parenthetical quotation reads, “Original 
meaning jurisprudence has been the dominant form of constitutional inter-
pretation during most of our nation’s history.”58  The question whether the 
refinement of originalist theory is in tension with the claim that originalist 
methods have dominated constitutional practice is an interesting one—on 
which I make a few remarks in a footnote.59  The main point is that Fried-
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man’s narrative is normatively charged—the image of conservative lawyers 
“hashing out” originalism in “skull sessions” seems intended to delegitimate 
originalist theory. 
Friedman’s discussion of the alleged novelty of originalism serves as 
the foundation for another portion of his narrative where the normative 
charge is apparent.  In a series of passages, Friedman asserts that conserva-
tive legal thinkers “shaped” originalism and implies that they did so in order 
to achieve the results that they found ideologically attractive.60  Consider the 
following passage: 
Conservative thinkers shaped the concept of originalism to suit their particular 
purposes.  For example, when critics pointed out the implausibility of ever discern-
ing the original “intentions” of the framers, Meese’s theory quickly morphed into 
that of original “meaning” or “understanding.”  The difference between the two in-
carnations of originalism was that whereas the first focused on the elusive specific 
intentions of the drafters of the Constitution itself, original meaning looked instead 
to the general vies of the entire ratifying generation.  These latter views were obvi-
ously more malleable and amorphous than those expressed at the Constitutional 
Convention or held by those who attended it.61 
The footnote that accompanies this paragraph62 cites a law review arti-
cle by Edwin Meese63 and the Office of Legal Policy Report64 for direct 
support. 
Once again, it is not clear that the history is accurate.  The best evi-
dence for a general theory of original-intentions originalism is found in At-
torney General Edwin Meese’s speech before the American Bar Association 
in 1985.65  Meese’s speech included the following passage: 
In reviewing a term of the Court, it is important to take a moment and reflect upon 
the proper role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system. The intended 
role of the judiciary generally and the Supreme Court in particular was to serve as 
the “bulwarks of a limited constitution.”  The judges, the Founders believed, would 
not fail to regard the Constitution as “fundamental law” and would “regulate their 
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decisions” by it.  As the “faithful guardians of the Constitution,” the judges were 
expected to resist any political effort to depart from the literal provisions of the 
Constitution.  The text of the document and the original intention of those who 
framed it would be the judicial standard in giving effect to the Constitution.66 
And even in this passage, it is clear that both the original meaning of the 
text and the intentions of the framers were to play a key role. 
Friedman asserts that conservatives shaped originalism to suit their 
particular purposes.  The implicit normative claim is that originalist theory 
is the unprincipled product of results-oriented theorizing, but the sources 
that Friedman cites simply do not support the claim he makes.  At best, 
these sources suggest that originalism changed in emphasis, from an early 
phase that focused on original intent to a later phase that emphasized origi-
nal meaning.  But Friedman’s sources provide absolutely no support for the 
normatively significant claims in the narrative—that changes in originalist 
theory were motivated by the desire to achieve “particular purposes.”  There 
are, of course, alternative explanations for these changes.  For example, the 
shift in emphasis from original intentions to original meaning may have 
been motivated by theoretical considerations such as an appreciation of the 
criticisms directed at original-intentions originalism. 
There is yet another passage in which the normative charge of Fried-
man’s narrative comes to the surface: 
[M]ost conservatives agreed that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on searches 
and seizures would apply to electronic surveillance.  As the OLP sourcebook ex-
plained in something akin to Orwellian doublespeak, while the Constitution’s 
“provisions may be applied to new circumstances as our society changes, its mean-
ing remains fixed and timeless.”67 
I take it that the normative significance of the phrase “Orwellian dou-
blespeak” is unmistakable.  The (slightly jumbled) reference is to George 
Orwell’s novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four68 with its fictitious language “New-
speak” and the Newspeak word “doublethink.”  Here is the famous passage: 
The keyword here is blackwhite. Like so many Newspeak words, this word has 
two mutually contradictory meanings. Applied to an opponent, it means the habit 
of impudently claiming that black is white, in contradiction of the plain facts. Ap-
plied to a Party member, it means a loyal willingness to say that black is white 
when Party discipline demands this. But it means also the ability to believe that 
black is white, and more, to know that black is white, and to forget that one has 
ever believed the contrary. This demands a continuous alteration of the past, made 
possible by the system of thought which really embraces all the rest, and which is 
known in Newspeak as doublethink. Doublethink is basically the power of holding 
  
 66. Meese, Speech Before the American Bar Association, supra note 65. 
 67. The Will of the People, p. 311. 
 68. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Secker and Warburg 1949). 
22 Lawrence B. Solum   
two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of 
them.69   
The accusation that an opponent has engaged in “something akin to Orwel-
lian doublespeak”70 is a serious one—it implies a lack of intellectual integ-
rity and a deliberate aim to deceive and manipulate. 
Is Friedman’s charge a fair one?  Is it the case that an assertion that 
“Constitution’s ‘provisions may be applied to new circumstances as our 
society changes, its meaning remains fixed and timeless’”71 is deceptive and 
that its assertion lacks intellectual integrity.  Friedman has nothing to say in 
support of this assertion; it is simply part of the narrative, offered as histori-
cal fact. 
The passage that Friedman quotes makes two assertions:  (1) constitu-
tional meanings are fixed, and (2) fixed constitutional meanings can be ap-
plied to new circumstances.  Interpreted charitably, these two assertions are 
fully consistent.  Interpreted so as to be maximally incoherent, the two as-
sertions are logically inconsistent and hence could be characterized as 
“something akin” to doublethink in Newspeak.  Friedman’s narrative does 
not even mention the possibility of a charitable interpretation, and instead 
presents the uncharitable reading as an historical fact. 
It is difficult to understand how Friedman could possibly have be-
lieved that the uncharitable reading is the best one and hence that his Orwel-
lian-doublespeak characterization is accurate.  To see why this is so, we 
need to make a brief detour into general legal theory.  When the detour is 
complete we will return to Friedman’s interpretation and characterization of 
the passage asserting that the Constitution’s “provisions may be applied to 
new circumstances as our society changes, its meaning remains fixed and 
timeless.”72 
What does it mean to say that the Constitution’s “meaning remains 
fixed and timeless”?73    Unfortunately, this question has two occurrences of 
the forms of the verb “to mean”—this is an awkward but unavoidable fact.  
For this reason, we will need to discuss the meaning of the word “mean-
ing.”74  “Meaning” is ambiguous—it has more than one sense.  When we 
refer to the meaning of a constitutional provision, we might refer to the lin-
guistic meaning or semantic content.  Call this first sense of meaning the 
semantic sense.  But the term “meaning” can also be used to refer to impli-
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cations, consequences, or applications.  Call this second sense of meaning 
the applicative sense.  We can also use the term “meaning” to refer to the 
purpose or function of a given constitutional provision.  Call this third sense 
of meaning the teleological sense.  These three senses of the word “mean-
ing” are related to one another, and this makes it both difficult and impor-
tant to keep them apart. 
This distinction is important to originalist theory—and in particular to 
the so-called “new originalism” or “original-meaning originalism” that is 
the subject of the “shaping,” “morphing,” and “refinement” that Friedman 
incorporates into his narrative.75  To fully appreciate the significance of the 
three senses of “meaning,” we need to introduce another theoretical distinc-
tion, between “interpretation” and “construction.” 
Here is a first, rough cut at definitions that mark the distinction: 
Interpretation: The activity that aims at recovery of the linguistic meaning—or 
semantic content—of a legal text.  (Interpretation aims at meaning in the semantic 
sense.) 
Construction: The activity of determining the legal effect—or application—of a le-
gal text, sometimes involving the articulation of subsidiary rules or doctrines.  
(Construction produces meaning in the applicative sense.)76 
With the three distinct senses of “meaning” and the interpretation-
construction distinction in mind, we can return to the passage asserting that 
the Constitution’s “provisions may be applied to new circumstances as our 
society changes, its meaning remains fixed and timeless.”77 
Consider the part of the passage that asserts that the meaning of the 
Constitution is fixed and timeless.  Interpreted charitably, this passage as-
serts that linguistic meaning (meaning in the semantic sense) is fixed.  That 
assertion is not only plausible: it is a general truth about the meaning of 
particular utterances (texts or oral communications).  For example, Article 
One of the Constitution uses the phrase “domestic violence.”78  That phrase 
has a contemporary linguistic meaning (or sense) that refers to violence 
within a family, such as spousal abuse or child abuse.  But that sense of the 
phrase did not exist at the time the Constitution was framed and ratified.  At 
that time, the phrase “domestic violence” referred to civic disturbances, e.g., 
  
 75. On the “new originalism” and “original meaning originalism,” see Randy E. 
Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Keith E. Whitting-
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 76. For another formulation, see Solum, supra note 75, at 933-34. 
 77. The Will of the People, p. 311. 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.; see generally Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence 
Clause in ‘New Originalist’ Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 129 (2009) (criticizing the 
argument that the meaning of the domestic violence clause is fixed and discussing the litera-
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riots and rebellions, that were internal to a state and not external, e.g., inva-
sions.79  We can call the claim that linguistic meaning is fixed, the fixation 
thesis.  The fixation thesis is an assertion about constitutional interpreta-
tion—in the sense that the interpretation-construction distinction assigns to 
the word “interpretation.” 
Now consider the part of the passage that asserts that constitutional 
“provisions may be applied to new circumstances as our society changes.”80  
This assertion is not an assertion about linguistic meaning.  How could it 
be?  To the extent that it is an assertion about meaning at all, it is an asser-
tion about meaning in the applicative sense.  In the vocabulary provided by 
the interpretation-construction distinction, the claim that the constitution can 
be applied to new circumstances is a claim about constitutional construc-
tion.  And it is a very modest claim.  The claim is simply the constitution 
can be given legal effect to new circumstances.  That claim expresses a very 
general truth about legal texts: they use language that is general (i.e., lan-
guage that abstracts from particular circumstances) and that enables legal 
texts to generate rules that can be applied in a variety of particular situa-
tions, including situation that are new or novel.  Call this claim about consti-
tutional construction, the novelty claim. 
Is the fixation thesis consistent with the novelty claim?  Of course, it 
is.  The fixation thesis is about meaning in the semantic sense: it is a claim 
about constitutional interpretation.  The novelty claim is a claim about 
meaning in the applicative sense: it is a claim about constitutional construc-
tion.  These claims cannot contradict one another.  The ability to believing 
them both is nothing like Orwell’s blackwhite, “the ability to believe that 
black is white, and more, to know that black is white, and to forget that one 
has ever believed the contrary.”81 
Friedman’s charge that simultaneous assertion of the fixation thesis 
and the novelty claim is akin to Orwellian doublespeak is based on an inter-
pretation that assumes that originalists were deliberately making a pair of 
assertions that contradicted one another with the intent to deceive.  But that 
interpretation seems implausible.  It violates the general principle of charity 
in interpretation: we assume that intelligent speakers rare utter logical con-
tradictions.  And how does Friedman think that originalists could believe 
that their Orwellian doublespeak could achieve any political purpose?  
Nineteen Eighty-Four was fiction, not fact.  Even the most pessimistic as-
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sessment of the political conditions that prevailed in the United States in 
1987 does not closely approximate the conditions of Oceania in 1984. 
Friedman has a story to tell about originalism, and the way that he tells 
that story is normatively charged.  What is unclear is whether the evidence 
that Friedman provides warrants the normative spin. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The role of history and narrative is both firmly established and end-
lessly contestable.  Narratives structure our understanding of the world, but 
much of the work that they do relies on implicit and unexamined assump-
tions about causal mechanisms and systematic regularities.  Narratives have 
normative force, but their power to move and persuade sometimes relies on 
implicit and unexamined assumptions about political morality and personal 
ethics.  When we read a grand narrative like The Will of the People, intellec-
tual prudence requires that we interrogate the causal and normative assump-
tions that hold the story together and give it normative force. 
But in the end, I want to emphasize the modest nature of the points 
that I have made.  The core of The Will of the People is a richly detailed 
story about the relationship between popular opinion and the Supreme 
Court’s construction of constitutional doctrine.  I have attempted to bring 
out some of the limitations of that narrative—to cabin its causal claims and 
question its normative significance.  But it would be a grave error to mis-
take focus on these limits and ignore the value of the narrative itself.  No 
one who dives into The Will of the People will emerge unaltered by the 
power of its story.  Friedman has written a transformative book; our intel-
lectual landscape has been changed.  The Will of the People is a scholarly 
achievement of the very highest order. 
 
